

The Victims of Attacks on Police Officials in South Africa

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1 Introduction

Murdering of police officials in South Africa have become endemic during the nineties. Each year since 1993 more than 200 killing occurred. This is in sharp contrast with the average of 67 murders of police officials in the United States of America, calculated over a period of 50 years, starting from 1945 through 1994 (Chapman 1998:3). Furthermore, the continuous killing of police officials since the inauguration of the democratic political dispensation in South Africa, did not make sense at all. Before the new democratic dispensation one could have argued, as many did, that the police officials are the strong arm of the oppressive government. One has to agree with Chapman's (1998: 73) statement that attacks on police officials are in fact attacks on the governmental authority because they are the visible and accessible representatives of the government. During September 1999, the then Minister of Safety and Security, then Sydney Mufamdi, appointed a multi-disciplinary research team to conduct research regarding these killings. This report reflects on those findings referring to the victims who have survived these attacks.

2 The Research Process

This report is based on the quantitative empirical research of the Multi-disciplinary Committee for the investigation of the Attacks and Murder of Police Officials in South Africa. The data gathering was conducted in four provinces only, namely Gauteng, Eastern Cape, Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal - as determined by the Minister of Safety and Security. The questionnaire, comprising 84 questions, were completed under supervision of Adj. Dir. Anna Jooste and Ser. Elsie Nel. This procedure started after they, accompanied by Supt. J.J. Buys and Dr. A. Minnaar, gave the needed briefing to the applicable Provincial Commissioners and their staff.

For the purposes of the research, all police officials who have survived an attack between 1996 and 1999, were summoned to voluntarily complete the questionnaire. The aim was to have at least a ten percent response rate, because that is statistically speaking acceptable for generalizations. The Western Cape's response had to be supplemented because the response rate was not acceptable and in the Eastern Cape the response rate was too high and had to be cut. The final result reflected a twenty percent response rate from those police officials who have survived an attack in these provinces. KwaZulu-Natal completed 165, Gauteng 145, Western Cape 138 and the Eastern Cape completed 68 questionnaires. Only 478 of the 517

could be utilized for the final result. There were 39 questionnaires which could not be used for different reasons, mainly because they were not completed in full.

This report is on those elements pertaining to the victims only.

3 Biographical Particulars

Only 432 (90,4%) of the respondents claimed to have had a docket opened regarding the incident(s) they were reporting about. Nine (1,9%) did not respond to this question, leaving 37 (7,7%) who said there were no docket opened. It should also be noted that only 372 (77,8%) reported the incident. Twelve (2,5%) said they thought it was not important enough to report it and 27 (5,6%) argued that, as experiencing an attack is, for them 'part of the job' they did not bother to report it. Two (0,4%) indicated that they were intimidated or threatened and another two (0,4%) said they were too afraid (which also boils down to intimidation) to report the incident.

Regarding gender, there were 446 (93,3%) male and 25 (5,2%) female police officials who have completed the questionnaire. Seven (1,5%) did not indicate their gender.

Concerning their age, the majority of the victims, namely 365 (76,35%) were between 21 and 35 years old. Only 9 (1,9%) were under 20 years of age. A mere 28 (5,9%) were between 41 and 50 years old and only one each were 51 to 60 and 61 and older.

Half of the respondents, namely 242 (50,6%) had the rank of sergeant when this research was being conducted. The other two main groups were the 141 (29,9%) constables and 68 (14,2%) inspectors. There were only 13 (2,7%) with the rank of captain and 4 (0,8%) superintendents in the research group.

The major group of respondents came from the Uniform Branches of the SAPS, namely 212 (44,4%). Some 83 (17,4%) represented the Crime Prevention Units at station level. Fifty five (11,5%) represented the detectives at station level, thirty six (7,5%) the Public Order Policing units and 19 (2,1%) Special Units.

One hundred and eighty two (38,1%) of the victims claimed to have been in a patrol van when they were attacked and 65 (13,6%) said they were in an unmarked police vehicle (sedan). Ninety nine (20,7%) were on foot, 26 (5,4%) were travelling in their own private vehicles, whilst only 6 (1,3%) were using a bus and 3 (0,6%) were in a train. Fourteen (2,9%) reported that the incident occurred when they were in a taxi.

Regarding their clothing, 242 (50,6%) reported to having been in uniform whilst 204 (42,7%) were in civilian clothing.

Interesting is the fact that 21 (4,6%) of the victims admitted being under the influence of alcohol during the attack. Eleven of these were off duty at the time as can be seen in the table below.

Table 1 - Duty Position Versus Influence of Drugs/Alcohol			
Under Influence of Drugs/ Alcohol	Duty Position Time of Attack		Total
	On Duty	Off Duty	
Yes	10	11	21
No	347	98	445
Total	357	109	466

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This table shows a statistical significant correlation between those police officials being under the influence of drugs or alcohol and being off duty at the time of the attack. It is interesting to note that there were ten officers who in fact admitted to being under influence whilst on duty. Another manipulation of the data - with no statistical significant correlation - showed that three of those under the influence were going to work and one was going home when they were attacked. Another three of those under the influence of alcohol when they were attacked, placed themselves on duty. This means that they were in fact off duty, but due to an incident they had to react to officially, they placed themselves on duty.

Because South Africa is still very race sensitive, the respondents were also asked to indicate their race with the view of possible special measures for such groups. This would be possible because especially the residential arrangements for the different race groups have been changing very slowly since February 1994 when, with the inauguration of democracy, racially differentiated neighborhoods have become absolute.

Table 2 - Race of Respondents				
Race	Response Group		Race National Distribution per Race 30 June 1999	
	Freq.	Perc	Freq.	Perc
Black	271	57,6	73220	57,63
White	109	23,19	38604	30,42
Asian	39	8,29	4604	3,62
Colored	51	10,85	10475	8,25
Total	470	98,3*	126903	100

* Eight respondents did not indicate their race .

Because the Blacks who responded are of the same proportions as the Blacks in the SAPS, one can consider to view their answers as representative of this population groups in the SAPS.

Regarding biographical data the researchers also asked the respondents to indicate how many years they have been in die police service when the attack occurred.

Table 3 - Years of Service				
	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Valid Percent</i>	<i>Cumulative Percent</i>
Less 1	13	2.7	2.8	2.8
Two	12	2.5	2.5	5.3
Three	12	2.5	2.5	7.9
Four	32	6.7	6.8	14.6
Five	31	6.5	6.6	21.2
Six	30	6.3	6.4	27.6
Seven	37	7.7	7.9	35.5
Eight	43	9.0	9.1	44.6
Nine	31	6.5	6.9	51.2
Ten	28	5.9	5.9	57.1
Eleven	52	10.9	11.0	68.2
Twelve	31	6.5	6.6	74.7
Thirteen	28	5.9	5.9	80.7
Fourteen	20	4.2	4.2	84.9
Fifteen	18	3.8	3.8	88.7
Sixteen	8	1.7	1.7	90.4
Seventeen	10	2.1	2.1	92.6
Eighteen	11	2.3	2.3	94.9
Nineteen	5	1.0	1.1	96.0
Twenty and More	19	4.0	4.0	100
<i>Total</i>	<i>471</i>	<i>98.5</i>	<i>100</i>	
Missing	7	1.5		
Total	478	100		

From this table it is clear that there is no marked or special characteristic about the victims regarding the amount of years they have been serving when the attack occurred.

The victims were also asked to respond about their basic personal fitness program. They have responded as follows:

Table 4 - Exercise per Week				
<i>Exercise</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Valid Percent</i>	<i>Cumulative Percent</i>
Don't Exercise	144	30.1	30.6	30.6

Table 4 - Exercise per Week				
Exercise	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Once	75	15.7	15.9	46.5
Twice	96	20.1	20.4	66.9
Thrice	68	14.2	14.4	81.3
Four	41	8.6	8.7	90.0
Five	32	6.7	6.8	96.8
Six	6	1.3	1.3	98.1
Seven and More	9	1.9	1.9	100.0
<i>Total</i>	<i>471</i>	<i>98.5</i>	<i>100.0</i>	
Missing	7	1.5		
Total	478	100.0		

Table 4 shows that the as much as 81,3 percent of the victims claim to exercise one to three times per week. This should keep them basically fit.

Further statistical manipulation indicated that 36 of the 141 (25,53%) of the Constables don't exercise, 82 of the 242 Sergeants (33,88%), and 20 of the 68 (29,41%) Inspectors. However, this research didn't find any statistical significant differences as far as rank and exercise is concerned.

4 Degree of Injury Sustained

The victims were asked to indicate their degree of injury. Their answers are reflected in the following table:

Table 5 - Degree of Injury		
Degree of Injury	Frequency	Percent
Critical	58	12.1
Serious	123	25.7
Slightly	86	18.0
None	203	42.5
<i>Total</i>	<i>470</i>	<i>98.3</i>
Missing	8	1.7
Total	478	100.0

A little more than one quarter, that is 123 (25,7%) of the victims said they have experience their injuries as serious, whilst 58 (12,1%) said it was critical. Eighty six (18%) said they were only injured slightly and 203 (42,5%) were not injured at all during the incident.

Furthermore, they were asked to indicate what part of their bodies were injured.

Table 6 - Body Part Injured		
<i>Injured Body Part</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Not Applicable	192	40.2
Head	47	9.8
Chest	25	5.2
Back	19	4.0
Stomach	11	2.3
Legs	28	5.9
Arms	30	6.3
Neck	3	.6
Side	2	.4
Hands	26	5.4
Feet	6	1.3
More Than One Part	81	16.9
<i>Total</i>	<i>470</i>	<i>98.3</i>
System	8	1.7
Total	478	100.0

When one take all the injuries to the head, chest, back and stomach (which all have the potential to be deadly), the figure amounts to 102 (21,7%) of the sustained injuries.

Significant differences were found regarding gender and the injured body part. As follows:

Table 7 - Gender versus Injured Body Part			
<i>Injured Body Part</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Total</i>
Not Applicable	182 (38,72%)	10 (2,12%)	192 (40,84%)
Head	42 (8,93%)	05 (1,06%)	47 (9,99%)
Chest	25 (5,3%)	-	25 (5,3%)
Back	17 (2,5%)	02 (0,4%)	19 (2,9%)
Stomach	11 (2,3%)	-	11 (2,3%)
Legs	28 (5,9%)	-	28 (5,9%)
Arms	29 (6,17%)	01(0,2%)	30 (6,37%)
Neck	03 (0,6%)	-	03 (0,6%)
Side	02 (0,4%)	-	02 (0,4%)

Table 7 - Gender versus Injured Body Part			
<i>Injured Body Part</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Total</i>
Hands	21 (4,46%)	05 (1,06%)	26 (5,52%)
Feet	06 (1,27%)	01 (0,4%)	07 (1,67%)
More Than One Body Part Injured	79 (16,9%)	02 (0,4%)	81 (17,3%)
Total	445 (94,6%)	25 (5,3%)	470 (100%)

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Table 7 shows that this research found statistical significant differences between the gender of the victims and the body parts injured during the attack. This table shows that it is because they are male that 182 (38,72%) of the respondents were able to get away with no injuries (Not Applicable), and only 10 (2,12%) of the female officers. It should be noted that these ten female respondents who responded with Not Applicable regarding injuries, comprises forty percent of the 25 female respondents participating in this research.

5 Vulnerability Factors

The research also showed some aspects which, in the normal execution of their duties, make the police officials more vulnerable to be attacked. These include the locality where they were serving, the dominant inhabitants of the area, where the incident occurred, the wearing of bullet proof protection and their type of clothing during the attack.

Table 8 - Locality of the Attack		
<i>Locality</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
National Highway	36	7.5
Business District	64	13.4
Urban Area	251	52.5
Rural Area	120	25.1
<i>Total</i>	<i>471</i>	<i>98.5</i>
System	7	1.5
Total	478	100.0

Although the above table's categories are not mutually exclusive (business district and urban area), it does give an account of the higher risk areas. Table 11 indicates the majority of the attacks, namely 251 (52,5%) occurred in an urban area, whilst 120 (25,1%) happened in rural areas. Only 36 (7,5%) happened on national highways and 64 (13,4%) in business districts.

Table 9 - Dominant Inhabitants of Attack Area		
<i>Dominant Inhabitants</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Not Applicable	44	9.2
Dominantly Colored	52	10.9
Dominantly White	51	10.7
Dominantly Black	306	64.0
Dominantly Asian	18	3.8
<i>Total</i>	<i>471</i>	<i>98.5</i>
Missing	7	1.5
Total	478	100.0

Regarding the population distribution in the area of attack, Table 12 shows that the majority of the attacks, that is 306 (64%) occurred in the areas where Blacks are the dominant inhabitants, followed by 52 (10.9%) attacks in the dominantly Colored areas and with only 51 (10.7%) in the white and 18 (3,8%) Asian dominated areas.

Table 10 - Where Attacked		
	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Desolate Spot	21	4.4
Street	163	34.1
Police Premises	45	9.4
Field/Sport/Recreation	9	1.9
Nat Highway/Road	30	6.3
Univ/Sch/Tech	4	.8
Own Home	14	2.9
Hostel/Barracks	9	1.9
Business Premises	24	5.0
Public Place	49	10.3
Drinking/Socialization Place	11	2.3
Other House	36	7.5
Any Form of Transport	10	2.1
Other Place	46	9.6
<i>Total</i>	<i>471</i>	<i>98.5</i>
Missing	7	1.5
Total	478	100.0

Table 10 shows clearly that streets seems to be the most dangerous areas, as 163 (34,1%) said that they were attacked in the street. Public places is second with 49 (10,3%) attacks occurring there. Forty five (9,4%) of the attacks occurred on police premises.

Table 11 - Means of Attack		
<i>Means of Attack</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Shot	252	52.7
Stabbed	59	12.3
Physical Force	58	12.1
Run Over by Vehicle	23	4.8
Bomb Attack	6	1.3
Burned	3	.6
Stoned	16	3.3
Other	53	11.1
<i>Total</i>	<i>470</i>	<i>98.3</i>
System	8	1.7
Total	478	100

Clearly Table 11 shows that the greater majority of the police officials, namely 252 (52,7%) were shot at. The group with the next highest frequency, is those that have been stabbed and attacked by means of physical force, that is 59 (12,3%) each. Twenty three (4,8%) were run over by a vehicle.

Table 12 - Bullet Proof Clothing		
<i>Bullet Proof Clothing</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
NA (Not on Duty)	65	13.6
Yes	98	20.5
No	307	64.2
<i>Total</i>	<i>470</i>	<i>98.3</i>
Missing	8	1.7
Total	478	100

According to Table 12, the greatest number, namely 307 (64,2%) were not wearing bullet proof clothing during the attack. Only 98 (20,5%) did wear body armor when the attack occurred.

The majority, that is, 242 (50,6%) were in uniform when the attack occurred. Two hundred and four (42,7%) were wearing civilian clothing.

The respondents were also asked to indicate why they did not wear bullet proof clothing. One hundred and seven (22,4%) indicated that it was not compulsory to do so, due to the type of duty they were performing, or because they were off duty. Another 61 (12,97%) indicated specifically that their type of duty did not require wearing body armor. Ninety six (20,1%) said it was not available, 10 (2,1%) said it is too heavy, 17 (3,6%) said it is not practical, 26 (5,4%) indicated that it hampered their movement, 9 (1,9%) and said it does not give adequate protection. Ten (2.1%) did not respond to this question.

6 Duties During the Incident

To try and determine the vulnerability factor of their duties, the research also asked questions about their duty position, duty type and duty situation. In this part of the questionnaire the respondents were also asked to indicate their behavior towards suspects (where applicable). Whether or not they were armed and with which type of weaponry, as well as whether or not they used these weapons during the assault, were also asked.

Table 13 - Duty Position of Victim		
<i>Duty Position</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
On Duty	357	74.7
Off Duty	112	23.4
<i>Total</i>	469	98.1
Missing	9	1.9
Total	478	100.0

According to Table 13, the majority of these respondents, namely 357 (74,7%) were attacked whilst on duty. Those who were attacked whilst off duty were only 112 (23,4%). Nine (1,9%) did not respond to the question.

Table 14 - Duty Type when Attacked		
<i>Duty Type</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
NA (Not on Duty)	86	18.0
Cell Duties	12	2.5
Attending Complaint*	93	19.5
Crime Investigation*	41	8.6
Vehicle Patrol*	58	12.1
Foot Patrol*	17	3.6
Interrogation of Suspect	1	0.2
Admin Duties	2	0.4
Guard Duties	8	1.7
Searching Suspect*	26	5.4

Table 14 - Duty Type when Attacked		
<i>Duty Type</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Processing Duties	4	0.8
Observation*	9	1.9
House Penetration*	9	1.9
Pointing Out Procedures	3	0.6
Unrest/Crowd Control*	3	0.6
Escort/Convoy*	6	1.3
Search Pulled Over Vehicle*	11	2.3
Charge Office Duties*	25	5.2
Other	55	11.5
<i>Total</i>	469	98.1
Missing	9	1.9
Total	478	100.0

Attending a complaint was registered by 93 (19,5%) of the respondents as the type of duty they were performing when they were attacked. That they were attacked whilst on vehicle patrol, was reported by 58 (12,1%) of the respondents. Searching a suspect was reported by 26 (5,4%). Forty one (8,6%) indicated the attacks occurred when they were investigating a crime. When one adds up all the types of services* where the police interact directly with the public, it amounts to 298 (62,34%) of the attacks (Table 24).

Table 15 - Duty Situation When Attacked		
<i>Duty Situation</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Not Applicable	309	64.6
Going to Work	43	9.0
Going Home	43	9.0
Placed On Duty Self	73	15.3
<i>Total</i>	468	97.9
Missing	10	2.1
Total	478	100.0

Table 15 shows 73 (15,3%) placed themselves on duty, 43 (9%) each were either going to work of going home when they were attacked.

Table 16 - Searching the Suspect		
	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Not Applicable	155	32.4
Yes	146	30.5
No	169	35.4
<i>Total</i>	<i>470</i>	<i>98.3</i>
System	8	1.7
Total	478	100.0

According to Table 16, 146 (30,5%) indicated that they were busy searching the suspect and 169 (35,4%) said they were not busy searching a suspect when they were attacked.

Table 17 - Handcuff the Suspect		
	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Not Applicable	193	40.4
Yes	105	22.0
No	173	36.2
<i>Total</i>	<i>471</i>	<i>98.5</i>
Missing	7	1.5
Total	478	100.0

Where applicable, 105 (22%) of the respondents said they did handcuff their suspects, but 173 (36,2%) didn't do so.

Table 18 - Armed During Attack		
	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Yes	389	81.4
No	82	17.2
<i>Total</i>	<i>471</i>	<i>98.5</i>
System	7	1.5
Total	478	100.0

Table 18 indicates that the vast majority, namely 389 (81,4%) were armed when they were attacked. Only 82 (17,2%) were not armed, and seven (1,5%) did not answer the question.

Statistical significant differences between gender and being armed during the attacked was registered.

Table 19 - Gender Versus Armed During Attack			
Gender	Armed During Attack		Total
	Yes	No	
Male	375	71	446
Female	14	11	25
Total	389	82	471

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The vast majority of male officials, that is 375 (79,61%) and only 14 (2,97%) of the female officials, were armed during the attack. These differences in carrying weapons during the attack, can be ascribed to the gender differences: males more than females carry their weapons when they are attacked.

Table 20 - Kind of Weapon Armed With		
Kind of Weapon	Frequency	Percent
Not Applicable	46	9.6
Official Hand Weapon (9 mm)	350	73.2
Official Rifle (R5/R1)	40	8.4
Private Hand Gun	7	1.5
Knife	1	.2
Sharp Instrument	2	.4
Other	25	5.2
<i>Total</i>	<i>471</i>	<i>98.5</i>
Missing	7	1.5
Total	478	100.0

It is quite clear from Table 20 that the majority, that is 350 (73,2%) of the victims were carrying their 9 mm pistols when they were attacked. Only 40 (8,4%) were carrying the R5 or R1 rifles and seven (1,7%) carried their private guns.

Table 21 - Use Weapon		
	Frequency	Percent
Not Applicable	62	13.0
Yes	212	44.4
No	196	41.0
<i>Total</i>	<i>470</i>	<i>98.3</i>

Table 21 - Use Weapon		
	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Missing	8	1.7
Total	478	100.0

Table 21 shows that 212 (44,4%) of the victims used their weapons during the attack whilst 196 (41%) said they did not have time to do so.

Table 22 - Hours On Duty Prior to Attack		
<i>Hours on Duty</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Not Applicable (Not On Duty)	76	15.9
One	46	9.6
Two	30	6.3
Three	42	8.8
Four	44	9.2
Five	45	9.4
Six	29	6.1
Seven	48	10.0
Eight	33	6.9
Nine	14	2.9
Ten	11	2.3
Eleven	30	6.3
More Than 12 Hours	21	4.4
<i>Total</i>	<i>469</i>	<i>98.1</i>
Missing	9	1.9
Total	478	100.0

Under normal circumstances police officials in the Uniform Branches work twelve hour shifts. According to the data in Table 22, 48 (10%) said they were attacked after being on duty for seven hours. This table, however, does not show any marked increase towards the end of the shifts, when the officials could arguably be tired and more vulnerable to an attack.

Table 23 - Gender Versus Attacker Know You are Police Official				
Gender	Attacker Know You are Police Official			Total
	Unknown	Yes	No	
Male	45	379	22	446
Female	5	17	3	25
Total	50	396	25	471

Chi Square 5,229 Df 2 Prob ,073

More male police officials, that is 379 (80,46%) were convinced that the perpetrators knew at the time of the attack that they were attacking a police official. The statistical manipulation of this data indicates that this is significant. That is, it is because of their gender that the men responded in this fashion. Clearly, the female police officials seem to be of the opinion that they are not so vulnerable to attack because they are police officials than their male counterparts.

Because of the general hypotheses that robbery is the motive for attacking police officials, the respondents were also asked to give their views on a statement relating to the fact. They said the following: The biggest single group of 281 (58,8%) said robbery was not the motive. Where robbery was seen as the motive, only 70 (14,6%) indicated the robbery of the fire arm of the police official as the motive. Eighteen (3,8%) were convinced the robbing of a motor vehicle was the motive for the attack, while 23 (4,8%) answered that the robbery of cash was the motive. There were 2 (0,4%) who said the robbing of their certificate of appointment was the motive for the attack.

7 Training

The respondents had to indicate whether or not they have attended one or more of 14 internal police courses. They have reacted as follows:

Table 24 - Training Courses Attended			
Course	Attended	Not Attended	Total
Basic Training before 1995	381 (79,7%)	89 (18,6%)	470 (98,3%)
Basic Training after 1995	87 (18,2%)	384 (80,3%)	471 (98,5%)
SWAT	339 (70,9%)	132 (27,6%)	471 (98,5%)
SWAT Refresher	145 (30,3%)	326 (68,2%)	471 (98,5%)
Tactical Survival	119 (24,9%)	352 (73,6%)	471 (98,5%)
Tactical Policing	156 (32,6%)	315 (65,9%)	471 (98,5%)
Unrest/Crowd Management	183 (38,3%)	288 (60,3%)	471 (98,5%)
Basic Visual Tracking	23 (4,8%)	447 (93,5%)	470 (98,3%)

Table 24 - Training Courses Attended			
Course	Attended	Not Attended	Total
Advanced Visual Tracking	20 (4,2%)	448 (93,7%)	468 (97,9%)
Basic Internal Security	93 (19,5%)	373 (78%)	466 (97,5%)
Self-defence	148 (31%)	318 (66,5%)	466 (97,5%)
Tonfa	236 (49,4%)	227 (47,5%)	463 (96,9%)
Counter-insurgency	71 (14,9%)	388 (81,2%)	459 (96%)
Advance Driving	61 (12,8%)	399 (83,5%)	460 (96,2%)
Other Tactical Courses	57 (11,9%)	401 (83,9%)	458 (95,8%)

Table 24 shows that those who did not attend these indicated courses varies between as much as 448 (93,7%) who did not attend the advanced visual tracking course to as little as 89 (18,6%) who did not attend the basic training course before 1995. What stands out is that 384 (80,3%) indicated that they did not, in the past five years, attended the basic SAPS training.

This research also found marked differences between male and female police officials regarding training issues.

Table 25 - Gender Versus Basic SAPS Training Before 1995			
Gender	Basic SAPS Training Before 1995		Total
	Yes	No	
Male	366	79	445
Female	15	10	25
Total	381	89	470

Chi Square 7,632 Df 1 Prob ,006

The data in Table 25 shows that more male than female police received the basic SAPS training before 1995. Again - the statistical manipulation indicates that this happened because they are male and not for some other reason. It suggests that before 1995 the male and female police officials were not subjected to the same extent to the basic SAPS training. However, one is encouraged that 381 (80,89%) witness that they did receive basic training.

The same finding was registered regarding the basic SAPS training after 1995. The statistical significance is even higher - and then the vast majority of both sexes indicate that they did not receive this basic training.

Table 26 - Gender Versus Basic SAPS Training After 1995			
Gender	Basic SAPS Training After 1995		Total
	Yes	No	
Male	75	371	446
Female	12	13	25
Total	87	384	471

Chi Square 15,286 Df 1 Prob ,000

Again - more male than female police officials affirmed this statement. That is, the trend that males are more subjected to the basis SAPS training continued after 1995. Furthermore, the disturbing fact is that only 87 (18,47%) said they have received basic training after 1995. Further investigation of the data showed that this could not be due to new recruitment, because there were only 27 who have indicated that they had five years and less years of service when the attack occurred. Another disturbing fact was that 11 respondents indicated they had had eight years of service when they received this basic SAPS training after 1995. Another ten claimed to have had eleven years of service behind them when they received the basic training! The implication is that they were serving as police officials for eight years without having received even the basic training. Fortunately they have survived the attack on them without having the benefit of even the basic training!

Table 27 - Gender Versus SWAT Training			
Gender	Received SWAT Training		Total
	Yes	No	
Male	327	119	446
Female	12	13	25
Total	339	132	471

Chi Square 7,523 Df 1 Prob ,006

The majority, namely 339 (71,9%) indicated that they did receive SWAT training. The statistical manipulation, however, again indicated high significance regarding the differences between the male and female respondents, showing that the male more than the female police officials received this training because of their gender.

Table 28 - Gender Versus Tactical Training			
Gender	Tactical Policing Course		Total
	Yes	No	
Male	152	294	446

Table 28 - Gender Versus Tactical Training			
Gender	Tactical Policing Course		Total
	Yes	No	
Female	4	21	25
Total	156	315	471

Chi Square 3,494 Df 1 Prob ,062

Only 156 (33,12%) of all the respondents indicated they attended the tactical policing course, the majority - that is 152 (32,27%) were male officers. The differences between the male and female officers are statistically significant. The implication is that the men are more released to attend this course because they are male.

Table 29 - Gender Versus Unrest and Crowd Management Course			
Gender	Unrest & Crowd Management Course		Total
	Yes	No	
Male	181	265	446
Female	2	23	25
Total	183	288	471

Chi Square 10.579 Df 1 Prob ,001

Table 29 continues to substantiate the fact that more male than female police officials are attending courses, in this case, the unrest and crowd management course.

Table 30 - Gender Versus Advanced Visual Tracking Course			
Gender	Advanced Visual Tracking Course		Total
	Yes	No	
Male	17	426	443
Female	3	22	25
Total	20	448	468

Chi Square 3,845 Df 1 Prob ,050

Although it is clear from the above data that there were only a small handful of male officers, namely 17 (3,6%) and even less women, namely 3 (0,63%) who attended this course, the statistical significance of this finding indicates that male attended this course more because they are men.

Regarding training a prevention strategy should provide for equal opportunities for male and female police

officials. Although female officers are attacked less than their male counterparts, this is not an acceptable reason for sidetracking them.

The respondents were also asked to rate their training. The biggest group, namely 322 (68,7%) rated it excellent and good. Only 98 (20,5%) rated the training as average, only 20 (4,2%) evaluated it as adequate and a mere 29 (6,1%) said their training was not good.

8 Personal Protection

Under this sub-heading data could be collected relating to the following issues: how many persons were present during the attack (based on the premises that there is safety in numbers), in who's company the victim was during the incident (to determine the defending capacity of the group if any), whether or not they carried their fire arms (on or off duty), the degree of injury they sustained in the attack as well as what part of the body of the victim was injured during the attack.

Table 31 - How Many Persons During the Attack		
Number	Frequency	Percent
Alone	101	21.1
One	106	22.2
Two	81	16.9
Three	39	8.2
Four	40	8.4
Five	26	5.4
Six	13	2.7
Seven	12	2.5
Eight and More	16	3.3
Group (20 and More)	35	7.3
<i>Total</i>	<i>469</i>	<i>98.1</i>
System	9	1.9
Total	478	100.0

Table 31 shows that 106 (22,2%) of the police officials were alone when the attack occurred, followed by 81 (16,9%) who had one other person accompanying the victim. Generally speaking, this table shows that, the more persons were in the group, the lesser they suffered an attack.

Table 32 - Who Accompanied You During Attack		
Company	Frequency	Percent
Alone	93	19.5
Spouse	6	1.3
Family	14	2.9
Friend	17	3.6
SAPS Member	271	56.7
Suspect/Attacker	11	2.3
Security Force Member	9	1.9
Law Enforcement Agent	1	.2
Witness/Complainant	5	1.0
Informer	3	.6
More Than One Category	26	5.4
Other	14	2.9
<i>Total</i>	<i>470</i>	<i>98.3</i>
System	8	1.7
Total	478	100.0

The majority, namely 271 (56,7%) were in the company of other SAPS members when the incident occurred. Only 11 (2,3%) indicated they were with a suspect and/or the attacker when the incident happened (Table 32).

Table 33 - Do You Carry Official Weapon Off Duty		
	Frequency	Percent
Yes	283	59.2
No	186	38.9
<i>Total</i>	<i>469</i>	<i>98.3</i>
System	9	1.9
Total	478	100.0

As many as 283 (59,2%) of the respondents conceded to carrying their official weapon when they are off duty and 186 (38,9%) said they do not carry the official weapon off duty. Nine (1,9%) did not respond to this question.

Carrying fire arms when off duty is something the male officers do much more than the female officers.

Table 34 - Gender Versus Carry Official Weapon Off Duty				
Gender	Carry Official Weapon Off Duty			Total
	Yes	No	3	
Male	271	174	-	445
Female	12	12	1	25
Total	283	186	1	471

Chi Square 18.928 Df 2 Prob ,000

Significantly more male police officials carry their official weapons more than the female officials when they are off duty.

Table 35 - Carry Official Fire Arm When Socializing		
Carry Weapon	Frequency	Percent
Yes	131	27.4
No	335	70.1
<i>Total</i>	466	97.5
Missing	12	2.5
Total	478	100.0

According to Table 35, the majority of the respondents, namely 335 (70,1%) said they do not carry their weapons when they are socializing.

The respondents were asked a few questions (apart from the open ended ones where they could also give comments on this issue) which related to prevention. The one was whether or not they seek professional help after being attacked.

Table 36 - Seek Professional Help		
Seek Help From	Frequency	Percent
Not Seek Help	219	45.8
Spoke To Family/Friend	63	13.2
Detraum in SAPS	19	4.0
Detraum Private	22	4.6
More Than One Institute	7	1.5
Private Psychological Help	15	3.1
Psychological SAPS	100	20.9
Other Type of Help	5	1.0

Table 36 - Seek Professional Help		
Seek Help From	Frequency	Percent
Total	450	94.1
System	28	5.9
Total	478	100.0

Table 36 shows the disturbing fact that as much as 219 (45,8%) did not seek professional help of any kind after the incident.

Sixty three (13,2%) only spoke to a friend or family member about it. Not even five percent, namely 19 (4%) said they activated the detraumatization services of the SAPS. One fifth, that is 100 (20,9%) used the psychological services of the SAPS, and 15 (3,1%) consulted private psychological help.

Regarding other internal services, a little more than one fifth, namely 109 (22,8%) indicated that they are aware of the protecting the protector program. However, only as little as 35 (7,3%) made use of it.

Because pressure at work can also detrimentally impact on prevention, they were also asked to indicate whether or not they - according to their own perception of it - were experiencing undue stress at work during the time of incident.

Table 37 - Pressure at Work		
Pressure	Frequency	Percent
Yes	247	51.7
No	198	41.4
Total	445	93.1
Missing	33	6.9
Total	478	100.0

Table 37 shows that just over half of the respondents, 247 (51,7%) experienced stress at work during the time of the incident. Thirty three (6,9%) did not respond to this issue, and 198 (41,4%) stated that they were not under a lot of stress at work during the time of the incident.

9 List of Findings

Based on the above information, the profile of the victim, based on this research, can be described as follows:

He is a Black male between 21 and 35 years old with the rank of Sergeant and works in the Uniform Branch

of the SAPS. He is on duty and patrolling the streets in uniform. During the attack he is injured in the upper body (head, chest, back and stomach).

Regarding the degree of injuries the victims sustained during the attack, it was shown in this research that as much as two thirds of the victims were injured (varying from slightly to critical according to their own perception). Males were more times injured during the attacks than females. The majority of the injuries were inflicted by shooting and stabbing.

Furthermore, with regards to some vulnerability factors which were isolated during this research, the following can be listed: armed with 9 mm pistol and on duty, directly interfacing with the public, in a Black, residential area. To be known to be a police official also seems to be a risky factor in these areas.

The finding regarding the training of the victims include that, according to the respondents, they (still) experience discrimination -favoring males - with reference to the following training courses: basic training, SWAT training, tactical training, unrest management training, and the advanced visual basic training. However, they have also indicated clearly that there is no discrimination between male and female officers concerning the following training courses: SWAT refresher course, basic internal security, self defense, tonfa, counter insurgency, advanced driving and the other tactical courses.

Finally, concerning personal protection issues, it was found during this research that - as could have been expected - the more persons there were in 'n group, the lesser they ran the risk of being attacked. It was also registered that the company of another police official does not necessarily translates into better personal protection from an attack. More male police officials carried their 9 mm pistols with them when they were off duty and socializing than was the case with the female officers, but this did not have an impact in reducing attacks on them. It should also be noted that the majority of those who survived these attacks did not seek professional help with the view of detraumatization.

10 Recommendations

To reduce the risks for the vulnerable age and rank group, internal orders could be reconsidered to make it compulsory for them to wear body armor whenever they are interacting with the public - especially when they are patrolling Black neighborhoods.

Because the majority of the injuries are inflicted by means of shooting and stabbing, the vulnerable group should be made aware of it. Applicable in-service training can be effected immediately to diminish their risks of being shot at or stabbed. Drilling in a simple but basic safety rule like always staying away from the public two arm lengths (one meter) could go a far way in avoiding stab wounds.

Regarding training, it goes without argument that the discrimination between male and female officers should be eradicated - even though the female officers are far less vulnerable to attacks. The fact that there is no

discrimination regarding some training courses, shows it can be done.

When they are on duty, the protection of bigger groups can be used to provide some extra protection against attacks. The carrying of officially issued weapons - on or off duty or even when socializing - increases the responsibility of the police official. Therefore it is recommended that training and more training in weapon handling should be instituted. It can even be considered to make the first hour of each shift compulsory weapons (re)training - on a daily basis. Some of these training sessions could be without ammunition, others with blanks and others with live ammunition.

The fact that those who have survived an attack did not seek professional help to assist them with de-traumatisation, is an issue of serious concern. Once a person has survived an attack his level of cool-headedness is negatively impacted. Such persons should not be allowed to serve again during the next shift as if nothing had happened. They ought to be de-traumatised - for their own safety and for the safety of the public and should only be allowed on the beat again once professionals in human behavior have declared them fit to do so.

11 Conclusion

From these results regarding the police who have been victims of attacks, it is clear that we cannot be proud of it in South Africa. These police officials have survived an attack from the very people they are protecting. It is not child's play to live with it. And to keep up the good work. The core business of the police is to uphold law and order, catch the criminals and to protect the public. When the very people they are protecting turn against them, it is a sad day for that country. Of course, the application of the recommendations forwarded in this article, will not solve the problem. It will, however, go some way to facilitate the security of the protectors. And it is cheap.

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